Resumiéndolo a cuatro palabras:
CORBA 2.0 se inició con éxito y popularidad al resolver el problema de desarrollo en sistemas heterogéneos:
It provided a standardized protocol and a C++ language mapping, with a Java language mapping following in 1998. This gave developers a tool that allowed them to build heterogeneous distributed applications with relative ease. CORBA rapidly gained popularity and quite a number of mission-critical applications were built with the technology.La aparición de Java, por un lado, y el crecimiento acelerado de la Web, presentaron un desafío a la consolidación del estándar:
CORBA provided a Java language mapping, but it did nothing to cooperate with the rapidly exploding Web. Instead of waiting for CORBA to deliver a solution, companies turned to other technologies and started building their e-commerce infrastructures based on Web browsers, HTTP, Java, and EJB (Enterprise JavaBeans).El estándar resultó complicado de utilizar frente al nuevo escenario:
Many of the APIs were complex, inconsistent, and downright arcane, forcing the developer to take care of a lot of detail. In contrast, the simplicity of component models, such as EJB, made programming a lot simpler (if less flexible), so calls for a CORBA component model became louder and louder.CORBA resultó además caro y de lento aprendizaje:
Commercial CORBA implementations typically cost several thousand dollars per development seat, plus, in many cases, runtime royalties for each deployed copy of an application. This limited broader acceptance of the platform—for many potential customers, CORBA was simply too expensive.Por otra parte, Microsoft no apoyó CORBA, y desarrolló su propio estándar, con pérdidas por ambos bandos:
The platform had a steep learning curve and was complex and hard to use correctly, leading to long development times and high defect rates. Early implementations also were often riddled with bugs and suffered from a lack of quality documentation. Companies found it difficult to find the expert CORBA programmers they needed.
Microsoft never embraced CORBA and instead chose to push its own DCOM (Distributed Component Object Model). This kept much of the market either sitting on the fence or using DCOM instead, but DCOM could not win the middleware battle either, because it worked only on Windows.La aparición de XML transformó el escenario:
Another important factor in CORBA's decline was XML. During the late '90s, XML had become the new silver bullet of the computing industry: Almost by definition, if it was XML, it was good. After giving up on DCOM, Microsoft wasn't going to leave the worldwide e-commerce market to its competitors and, rather than fight a battle it could not win, it used XML to create an entirely new battlefield. In late 1999, the industry saw the publication of SOAP. Originally developed by Microsoft and DevelopMentor, and then passed to W3C for standardization, SOAP used XML as the on-the-wire encoding for remote procedure calls.El colapso de la burbuja de Internet, produjo un efecto mortal en CORBA:
SOAP had serious technical shortcomings, but, as a market strategy, it was a masterstroke. It caused further fragmentation as numerous vendors clambered for a share of the pie and moved their efforts away from CORBA and toward the burgeoning Web services market. For customers, this added more uncertainty about CORBA's viability and, in many cases, prompted them to put investment in the technology on hold.
The industry's financial collapse drove many software companies out of the market and forced the survivors to refocus their efforts. The result was significant attrition in the number of commercial CORBA products. Before the collapse, several vendors had already dropped or deemphasized their CORBA products and, after the collapse, more followed.Y lo más importante, las reflexiones de Henning sobre el estándar:
Technical excellence is not a sufficient prerequisite for success but, in the long term, it is a necessary prerequisite. No matter how much industry hype might be pushing it, if a technology has serious technical shortcomings, it will eventually be abandoned. This is where we can find the main reasons for CORBA's failure.Henning puntualiza los problemas de CORBA:
Complejidad (en el desarrollo de las APIs, en el uso del lenguaje C++, complejidad de tipos usados, especificaciones innecesarias)
Falta de servicios disponibles, Seguridad, Versionamiento, los puntos especialmente señalados:
CORBA's unencrypted traffic is subject to eavesdropping and man-in-the-middle attacks, and it requires a port to be opened in the corporate firewall for each service. This conflicts with the reality of corporate security policies. (Incidentally, this shortcoming of CORBA was a major factor in the rise of SOAP. Not having to open a port in the corporate firewall and sending everything via port 80 was seen as a major advantage, despite the naïvete of that idea.) The OMG made several attempts at specifying security and firewall traversal for CORBA, but they were abandoned as a result of technical shortcomings and lack of interest from firewall vendors.La lista de defectos técnicos es más minuciosa, pero no quisiera terminar repitiendo el contenido del artículo, aunque sigo pensando que es mejor esto que perderlos, ya que los textos en Internet suelen ser movidos de ubicación.
Deployed commercial software requires middleware that allows for gradual upgrades of the software in a backward-compatible way. CORBA does not provide any such versioning mechanism (other than versioning by derivation, which is utterly inadequate). Instead, versioning a CORBA application generally breaks the on-the-wire contract between client and server. This forces all parts of a deployed application to be replaced at once, which is typically infeasible. (This shortcoming of CORBA was another major factor in the rise of SOAP. The supposedly loosely coupled nature of XML was seen as addressing the problem, despite this idea being just as naïve as funneling all communications through port 80.)
Pero Henning destaca otro aspecto del declinamiento de CORBA, que es repetido a través de la corta historia de la construcción de software: la idoneidad o capacidad de la institución promotora del estándar. ¿Evolución a través de la investigación académica? ¿de un consorcio de la industria? ¿de una combinación de empresas, instituciones de educación e investigación? ¿la introducción de nueva tecnología por parte de una empresa?
CORBA contó con el soporte de OMG. Qué critica Henning:
Estas características pudieran adscribirse a múltiples consorcios. Henning especifica éste para OMG:
The OMG is an organization that publishes technology based on consensus. In essence, members vote to issue an RFP [Request for proposal]for a specification, member companies submit draft specifications in response, and the members vote on which draft to accept as a standard. In theory, this democratic process is fair and equitable but, in practice, it does not work:
There are no entry qualifications to participate in the standardization process. Some contributors are experts in the field, but, to be blunt, a large number of members barely understand the technology they are voting on. This repeatedly has led to the adoption of specifications with serious technical flaws.
RFPs often call for a technology that is unproven. The OMG membership can be divided into roughly two groups: users of the technology and vendors of the technology. Typically, it is the users who would like to expand CORBA to add a capability that solves a particular problem. These users, in the hope that vendors will respond with a solution to their problem, drive issuance of an RFP. Users, however, usually know little about the internals of a CORBA implementation. At best, this leads to RFPs containing requirements that are difficult to implement or have negative performance impact. At worst, it leads to RFPs that are little more than requests for vendors to perform magic. Instead of standardizing best existing practice, such RFPs attempt to innovate without prior practical experience.
Vendors respond to RFPs even when they have known technical flaws. This may seem surprising. After all, why would a vendor propose a standard for something that is known to suffer technical problems? The reason is that vendors compete with each other for customers and are continuously jostling for position. The promise to respond to an RFP, even when it is clear that it contains serious problems, is sometimes used to gain favor (and, hopefully, contracts) with users.
Vendors have a conflict of interest when it comes to standardization. For vendors, standardization is a two-edged sword. On the one hand, standardization is attractive because it makes it easier to sell the technology. On the other hand, too much standardization is seen as detrimental because vendors want to keep control over the features that distinguish their product from the competition.
Vendors sometimes attempt to block standardization of anything that would require a change to their existing products. This causes features that should be standardized to remain proprietary or to be too vaguely specified to be useful. Some vendors also neglect to distinguish standard features from proprietary ones, so customers stray into implementation-specific territory without warning. As a result, porting a CORBA application to a different vendor's implementation can be surprisingly costly; customers often find themselves locked into a particular product despite all the standardization.
RFPs are often answered by several draft specifications. Instead of choosing one of the competing specifications, a common response of OMG members is to ask the submitters to merge their features into a single specification. This practice is a major cause of CORBA's complexity. By combining features, specifications end up as the kitchen sink of every feature thought of by anyone ever. This not only makes the specifications larger and more complex than necessary, but also tends to introduce inconsistencies: Different features that, in isolation, are perfectly reasonable can subtly interact with each other and cause semantic conflicts.
Major vendors occasionally stall proceedings unless their pet features make it into the merged standard. This causes the technology process to degenerate into political infighting, forces foul compromises, and creates delays. For example, the first attempt at a component model was a victim of such infighting, as was the first attempt at a C++ mapping. Both efforts got bogged down to the point where they had to be abandoned and restarted later.
The OMG does not require a reference implementation for a specification to be adopted. This practice opens the door to castle-in-the-air specifications. On several occasions the OMG has published standards that turned out to be partly or wholly unimplementable because of serious technical flaws. In other cases, specifications that could be implemented were pragmatically unusable because they imposed unacceptable runtime overhead. Naturally, repeated incidents of this sort are embarassing and do little to boost customer confidence. A requirement for a reference implementation would have forced submitters to implement their proposals and would have avoided many such incidents.En fin, el análisis de Henning puede verse lateralmente como una historia de CORBA, pero centralmente como una reflexión sobre las intrincadas vías de evolución de la tecnología. Henning dice: "Open source innovation usually is subject to a Darwinian selection process". Sin duda, debemos extender la afirmación al conjunto de procesos de innovación.