Microsoft reenfocándose

Una noticia reciente poco comentada, pero quizá importante, ha sido la de abrir .NET y C# a proyectos open source, digamos, en mayor medida de lo hecho anteriormente. Recogido por Mary Jo Foley a comienzos de abril, pocos comentarios más se vieron en casi dos meses. Siguiendo a eWeek, Microsoft anunció en su conferencia Build 2014, sus planes en open source: la creación de una fundación (.NET Foundation), veinticuatro proyectos para iniciar actividades, y la conformación de una dirección integrada por funcionarios de Microsoft, de la subsidiaria Microsoft Open Technologies, y Miguel de Icaza. Entre los proyectos puestos en open source, está .NET Compiler Platform ("Roslyn"), y un par vinculados a Xamarin, la implementación de Miguel de Icaza de la plataforma de desarrollo.NET para dispositivos Android, iOS y GNU/Linux (el desarrollo completo en el comunicado de la fundación). En eWeek:

Microsoft formed the .NET Foundation to foster further innovation across the .NET ecosystem. The .NET Foundation will start with 24 .NET open-source projects under its stewardship, including the .NET Compiler Platform (previously known as "Roslyn") and the ASP.NET family of open-source projects, as well as the MimeKit and Mailkit libraries from Xamarin.

"We are going to be delivering a preview of the Roslyn compiler as a service," Somasegar said. "The most interesting thing that we're doing there is we are making both our C# compiler and our VB [Visual Basic] compiler open source. You want to be able to work with the community, you want to be able to take contributions back from the community, and you want to be able to work in the open. The other thing we are doing is adding support for .NET in Azure Mobile Services." - 

Tanto de la lectura de los comunicados iniciales, como de los comentarios de Foley o Tim Anderson, se puede decir que lo más importante a la vista es la mayor colaboración con Xamarin e Icaza, y por lo tanto, un frente más en la apuesta por ganar un lugar en las tecnologías móviles. Tim Anderson pone especialmente el acento en este futuro móvil:

The focus now though is on mobile, and interest in C# is stronger, mainly from Microsoft-platform developers reaching beyond Windows. There is also Unity, which uses C# as a scripting language for developing games for multiple platforms, including iOS, Android, Windows, Mac, Linux, Xbox, PS3 and Wii – PS4 is coming very soon.
Microsoft has now consciously embraced multiple platforms, as evidenced by Office for iOS as well as the Xamarin collaboration. “We want C#developers to build great applications across different form factors and different device platforms,” said Jay Schmelzer Director of Program Management for Visual Studio.
You might observe that this position has been forced on the company by the rise of iOS and Android, a view which likely has some merit, but the impact it has on C# and .NET itself is still real.

Una nueva acción  en el sentido de adecuarse al rumbo actual y próximo del mercado tecnológico, como los movimientos de apertura de Office o los intentos de mejorar la posición de sus tabletas. ¿Con qué alcance? probablemente, destinado a ofrecer una alternativa al mercado propio en el ajeno de Android o iOS.
¿Hasta qué punto este nuevo lanzamiento es open source?  Si atendemos al inicio, en cuanto al carácter abierto de la fundación, su directiva es casi completamente Microsoft:

The new foundation will be initially staffed by Microsoft and third parties, including a representative from the Microsoft Open Technologies subsidiary and someone from the .NET organization, as well as Miguel de Icaza, CTO and co-founder of Xamarin, which is partnering with Microsoft on a related effort, Somasegar said.
"There will be a board of directors," he said. "There are going to be a couple of people from Microsoft that are going to be on the board. There will be one person from MS Open Tech that's going to be on the board; there will be one person from the .NET team that will be on the board. We are also getting Miguel de Icaza to be on the board, so we'll have at least one third-party person on the board from Day 1. And we'll have a couple of third-party projects, including efforts from Xamarin and others. Our plan is, over time, to expand the board to include more people. There will be a board that will govern the .NET Foundation. Microsoft will initially have a strong presence, but it will not be exclusively Microsoft."

Mi primera impresión fue de sorpresa, ya en que demasiadas ocasiones las grandes empresas mandan a open source los productos que dejan de ser centrales en sus proyectos: una manera de reducir fondos a un producto que no está en sus planes, descargando en una comunidad el esfuerzo futuro de desarrollo. Sin embargo, en este caso, existe un deseo de mantener un control estricto sobre la conducción de la fundación, y existe un área de sumo interés futuro. En los artículos de Foley hay parecidas impresiones:

I have to admit that I wasn't sure if Microsoft's decision to open-source more of .Net would be met by cheers or jeers by those attending Build last week. I was curious if developers might see the move as an indicator that Microsoft no longer considered .Net valuable enough to keep in-house as part of its collection of crown jewels. Most of the devs with whom I spoke at the show seemed upbeat about the move, however.
Hejlsberg told attendees of a press panel during Build that Microsoft is not abandoning .Net.
"We are actively investing in .Net going forward," Hejlsberg said, in response to an audience question as to whether Microsoft was putting .Net on the back burner.
"It's not going away," Hejlsberg said. "We are all in on .Net."

El tiempo, más rápidamente que lo que nos podríamos pensar, irá diciendo a dónde va esta iniciativa. La competencia actual no da lugar a muchas dudas.

Apple: cambio tecnológico, otra hegemonía

Tim Worstall, en Forbes, comenta el hecho histórico del cambio en la posición relativa de Apple frente a Microsoft: sólo el negocio de Iphone es mayor que todas las líneas de negocios de Microsoft combinadas. Y estima que este hecho marca hasta qué punto a cambiado el alcance de la informática de escritorio y del consumidor final:

But to someone like me who started paying attention to the computer industry around 1988, 89, this is a gross affront to the established worldview. Apple’s the plucky little upstart with a niche business and Microsoft is the globally encompassing near monopolist of the desktop.
Not that either of those were entirely and wholly true at any point but that has been, until just these last few years of iPods, iPhones and iPads, the general background to any story comparing the two firms.
So the world has changed since my youth then: possibly not the most perceptive observation anyone has ever made I agree.

Lo que resalta Worstall es que el avance de Apple es producido por el desplazamiento del centro de gravedad de la tecnología, y la presencia de de un nuevo universo, fuera del alcance del competidor hegemónico. Algo que ya le pasó a IBM antes, frente a Microsoft precisamente:

Back in the very early days of personal computing it was possible to think that this might come true: that Apple, making both hardware and operating systems would beat the highly fragmented world of the IBM compatible PC. Then for about 25, 30 years it wasn’t, in fact it was near inconceivable that Apple would ever in any way “beat” the Beast of Redmond and yet now they are.
But as I’ve remarked before, they’ve not done it by replacing Windows or Office, the things that tie the PC to Microsoft. They’ve done an end run around the end and edge of the whole PC technology. Which is also as I’ve said before. Monopolies tend to fall not when they are beaten in their own market but when their market becomes only a subset of a wider one, when advancing technology makes the monopolist’s position almost irrelevant.

Enfocándose en lo viejo...

Esto se ha comentado en el último tiempo muchas veces (incluso aquí), pero, qué bien que lo cuenta Adam Hartung. Adam, en Forbes, comenta la diferencia que existe entre las buenas cifras de ganancias de Apple, y las "buenas cifras" de Microsoft.

(...) Even though Microsoft earnings were up, it wasn’t because they are selling what customers really want to buy. Microsoft has caught the “Wal-Mart Disease” – constantly trying to do more of what it always did, hoping it can regain old results – even as the market keeps shifting.  In stalled companies, executives cut costs in sales, marketing, new product development and outsource like crazy in order to prop up earnings.  They can outsource many functions.  And they go the resorvoir of accounting rules to restate depreciation and expenses, delaying expenses while working to accelerate revenue recognition.  While Microsoft had higher earnings than last quarter, it wasn’t because customers were excited about their products!

When companies are growing, investors likes management to pump earnings (and cash) back into growth opportunities.  Investors benefit because their value compounds. In a stalled company investors would be better off if the company paid out all their earnings in dividends – so investors could invest in the growth markets.
But, of course, stalled companies like Microsoft and Research in Motion, don’t do that.  Because they spend their cash trying to defend the old business.  Trying to fight off the market shift.  At Microsoft, money is poured into trying to protect the PC business, even as the trend to new solutions is obvious. Microsoft spent 8 times as much on R&D in 2009 as Apple – in both dollars and as a percent of revenue – and all investors received were updates to the old operating system and office automation products.  That nearly $9B expense generated almost no incremental demand.  While revenue is stalling, costs are rising.
At Gurufocus.com the argument is made “Microsoft Q3 2011: Priced for Failure“.  Author Alex Morris contends that because Microsoft is unlikely to fail this year, it is underpriced.  Actually, all we need to know is that Microsoft is unlikely to grow.  Its cost to defend the old business is too high in the face of market shifts, and the money being spent to defend Microsoft will not go to investors – will not yield a positive rate of return.
(...) While much has been made of the ballyhooed relationship between Nokia and Microsoft to help the latter enter the smartphone and tablet businesses, it is far too late.  Customer solutions are now in the market, and the early leaders – Apple and Google Android – are far, far in front.  The costs to “catch up” – like in on-line – are impossibly huge.  Especially since both Apple and Google are going to keep advancing their solutions and raising the competitive challenge.  What we’ll see are more huge losses, bleeding out the remaining cash from Microsoft as its “core” PC business continues declining.
(...)
Many analysts will examine a company’s earnings and make the case for a “value play” after growth slows.  That’s a mythical bet.  When a leader misses a market shift, by investing too long trying to defend its historical business, the late-stage earnings often contain a goodly measure of “adjustments” and other machinations.  To the extent earnings do exist, they are wasted away in defensive efforts to pretend the market shift will not make the company obsolete.  Late investments to catch the market shift cost far too much, and are impossibly late to catch the leading new market players.  The company is well on its way to failure, even if on the surface it looks reasonably healthy.  It’s a sucker’s bet to buy these stocks.
Rarely do we see such a stark example as the shift Apple has created, and the defend & extend management that has completely obsessed Microsoft in the wake of this shift.  But it has happened several times.  Small printing press manufacturers went bankrupt as customers shifted to xerography, and Xerox waned as customers shifted on to desktop publishing.  Kodak declined as customers moved to film-less digital photography.  CALMA and DEC disappeared as CAD/CAM customers shifted to PC-based Autocad.  Woolworths was crushed by discount retailers like KMart and WalMart.  B.Dalton and other booksellers disappeared in the market shift to Amazon.com.  And even mighty GM faltered and went bankrupt after decades of defend behavior, as customers shifted to different products from new competitors.  Buying into any of the losers as a “value play” meant you lost money.

Not all earnings are equal.  A dollar of earnings in a growth company is worth a multiple.  Earnings in a declining company are, well, often worthless.  Those who see this early get out while they can – before the company collapses.

Parecería ser que hemos alcanzado el punto en que Microsoft siga el camino de otros grandes actores de la industria de la informática: siguen sin observarse signos claros de cambio en su gerenciamiento, y probablemente otros ocuparán su puesto de liderazgo.

Apple/Microsoft: Dos estrategias, dos modelos

Esta es la segunda nota relacionada con la explosión de la computación móvil. En esta segunda, de lo que se trata es de la capacidad de adaptación a la evolución de la industria. Así como hace treinta años la aparición de la PC opacó a la industria basada en mainframes, y hace alrededor de quince la World Wide Web produjo el florecimiento de múltiples actores y negocios, hoy la telefonía móvil vuelve a renovarlo todo.
En los últimos tiempos, se ha escrito mucho sobre el sorprendente cambio de la relación entre Apple y Microsoft, si nos remontamos a la época en que Microsoft salió al rescate de una Apple al borde de la quiebra. En estos días, una nota de Adam Hartung, reflexiona en Forbes con claridad sobre el significado y alcance de esta transformación. un cambio de hegemonías que tiene que ver con estilos de gerenciamiento y visión. Dice Hartung:

Most folks know that Apple is now worth more than Microsoft.  Although few realize the huge difference.  After years of dominating as the premier “PC” company, Microsoft is now worth only about 2/3 the value of Apple – $224B versus $310B (or, said differently, Apple is worth about 50% more than Microsoft.)  Apple’s has slingshotted past Microsoft the last year because Apple grew revenue almost 50% in both fyscal 2009 and 2010 – thus doubling revenues. Contrarily, Microsoft saw revenue decline 3% in 2009, and only grow 7% in 2010, putting revenues up a net 3% over the 2 years.
What few realize is how much Microsoft spent trying to grow, but failed.  A look at 2009 R&D expenditures showed Microsoft outspent all tech competitors in its class – spending 8 times what Apple spent!

What did customers and investors receive for this whopping Microsoft outlay? An updated operating system (Windows 7, built on Vista) and set of office automation tools (Office 2010) to run on existing products.  Nothing that excited customers, created new demand, or incremental sales.  On the other hand, for its much lower spending Apple gave investors upgrades to iPods, the iPhone and the operating system for the later released iPad.
Microsoft opened its check book and spent like crazy in its effort to defend its historical PC products business.  And the cost was more than just dollars.  That “focus” cost Microsoft its position in other growth markets; like smartphones.   Few recall that as recently as 2008 Microsoft was the leading smartphone platform:

In order to defend its “core” business, Microsoft under-invested in smartphones and over-invested in its historical personal computing products.  Now, PC growth has stalled as people are switching to new products based on cloud computing – like smartphones and tablets.

Apple is cleaning up with its investments, while Microsoft is hoping it can catch up by enticing its former executive, now the CEO at Nokia, to revamp Nokia’s cellular product line using the Windows Phone 7 operating system.  Good luck, because the market is already way, way out front with Apple and Android products:

That was the past. We’d like to know if Apple will keep growing like crazy, and if Microsoft will do what’s necessary to grow as well.  And that’s where some recent announcements point out that Apple, quite simply, is better managed than Microsoft.  Apple management is making decisions helping the company to grow, and Microsoft isn’t.
ZDNet reported on the “changing of the guard” at Apple in March.  Due to its different product development investment approach, iOS is now bigger than the MacOS.  The “legacy” product – that made Apple into a famous company in the 1980s – has been eclipsed by the new product.  And the old technology leader is graciously moving on to do research in a scientific community, while Apple pours its resources into developing products for the future. New people, in new roles, pushing new products for new markets.  That’s smart.
Lest we forget history, the Lisa was a product that Steve Jobs personally shepherded to market – yet didn’t succeed.  He personally remained involved, converting Lisa into the wildly successful 1980s Mac (see AOL Small Business story on history of Lisa and Mac.) You gotta love it when that CEO, his leadership team and all the managers later transition their primary loyalty and put resources into the future product line in order to keep growing!  MacOS is not dead, not declining, nor is it going to be devoid of resources.  But the future of Apple lies in growing the new platform, and that is where the most resources, best talent and dollars are being focused.
Comparatively, Microsoft announced this week it is changing its Chief Marketing Officer (SeattlePI.com.) And, not surprisingly, Microsoft did NOT select someone with smartphone, tablet or even gaming/entertainment expertise for the role.  Even though those markets are clearly where future growth lies.  Instead of identifying a leader who deeply understands the emerging, growth markets, Microsoft appointed as the next CMO the fellow who had been responsible for selling – wait – guess – Office, Sharepoint, Exchange and the other historical, legacy Microsoft products.  Those products which have had very little growth – primarily maintenance sales.  Instead of reaching into the future for its leadership, CEO Ballmer once again reached into the past.  Hard to be optimistic about growth.
If you ever wonder why Apple is worth so much more to investors than Microsoft, just think about this moment in the marketplace.  Apple is investing its best talent and resources into new products in new markets that are demonstrating growth.  Microsoft, struggling with growth, keeps placing “old guard” leaders into top positions, attempting to defend the historical business – hoping to recapture past glory.
Apple is better managed because it keeps looking to the future, while Microsoft just can’t seem to get over its past.  Good thing Steve Ballmer is already rich.  Too bad all the Microsoft employees aren’t.

¿Es un negocio consistente la telefonía móvil, o se trata de una burbuja? Seguramente es un negocio que llega para permanecer, aunque quizá Apple no sea la firma de mayor valor del mundo, como su valuación en bolsa indica. Si no sucumbe a una eventual burbuja, su existencia futura está asegurada. La suerte de Microsoft seguramente también, pero con serios problemas de conducción...
Los gráficos son originales de la nota de Adam Hartung, quien indica que su fuente es Silicone Alley Insider Chart of the Day, de BusinessInsider.com

Telefonía móvil, batalla por la hegemonía en TI

Dos notas sobre computación móvil: una sobre hechos, la otra sobre estrategias, ambas sobre tendencias.La primera, firmada por Tamara Toro, en América Economía, describe lo que representa el cambio de escenario más grande que ha habido desde la aparición de la World Wide Web: la masificación universal de la telefonía móvil, acompañada de la "computación en la nube". Un cambio que se ha transladado a la renovación de los actores en la industria del software, sea por readaptación a estos cambios, o sea por la aparición de nuevas empresas. Vayamos a la primera nota: la guerra de sistemas operativos para smartphones. Dice Tamara Toro, basándose en estudios de IDC:

La batalla en el mundo de los sistemas operativos para teléfonos inteligentes (o smartphones) se ha ido transformando en una lucha cada vez más encarnizada entre los cuatro desarrolladores mundiales más grandes de la industria, que por medio de lanzamientos y nuevas aplicaciones han pertrechando sus respectivas posiciones de mercado.


Se trata de marcas reconocidas por los consumidores, pues en los últimos años el nivel de penetración que han mostrado ha sido avasallador. Los que hoy dominan el mercado son el Android de Google y el Symbian de Nokia, aunque éste último ya tiene fecha de defunción, pues fue reemplazo por Windows Phone 7 de Microsoft, sistema que pretende reverdecer los laureles de la marca finlandesa en la nueva era "smart" de la telefonía.


Tras ellos se quedan el Blackberry OS, de la canadiense RIM; y el iPhone OS, de Apple. Bastante más resagado, y con cifras marginales a nivel global, se sitúa el WebOS, de Palm-HP, que aún no ha despegado como se esperaba.

Las cifras de mercado evidencian el liderazgo de Android en el sector, con ventas de smartphones con este sistema en el 4Q de 2010 superiores a los 32,9 millones. Según la consultora Canalys, durante el mismo periodo el volumen de teléfonos inteligentes basados en sistemas operativos de Google, no sólo Android, sino también OMS y Tapas, crecieron bastante de la mano de vendedores como LG, Samsung, Acer y HTC, anotándo tasas de 4,1%, 1,4%, 709% y 371% respectivamente.

Los números de Google, con su sistema operativo estrella (Android) y los secundarios, se enfrentan a los 31 millones de envíos de Nokia y su plataforma Symbian, que en la última etapa del año pasado mostró un leve baja frente al gigante estadounidense de los bucadores de internet y probablemente durante 2011 siga con la misma tendencia debido a la transición hacia el Windows Phone 7, aunque analistas preveen que será un efecto parcial de "acomodamiento".


Al respecto, Ramon Llamas, investigador senior del equipo de Mobile Devices Technology and Trends de la consultora IDC, dice que recién se espera el lanzamiento de los primeros equipos de esta unión hacia el año 2012. "Para el 2015, en IDC esperamos que Windows Phone sea el sistema operativo número dos a nivel mundial, después de Android", asegura Llamas.

Según la consultora, este año Android dominará el mercado con el 39,5%, secuandada por el Symbian, con el 20,9%; el iOS de Apple, con el 15,7%; el BlackBerry OS, con el 14,6%; el Windows Phone 7 y Mobile (sin Nokia aún), con el 5,5%; y otros sistemas operativos, con el 3,5%.

Hacia el 2015, Android seguiría dominando el mercado, ahora con el 45,4%, pero Symbian (desaparecerá paulatinamente) sería desplazado del segundo lugar por Windows Phone 7 (con Nokia) con el 20,9%. En el tercer lugar se posicionaría el iOS, con el 15,3%; y en el cuarto BlackBerry OS, con el 13,7%. Symbian estaría en el último lugar, con el 0,2% de la cuota de mercado, superado incluso por otras plataformas, con el 4.6%


El reporte de IDC presume que los usuarios de Nokia se mantendrán fieles a la marca y migrarán de Symbian a Windows Phone 7, olvidando que Nokia se retirará por un tiempo del mercado.


Competencia de Ecosistemas. Roberta Cozza, especialista en dispositivos móviles de la consultora Gartner, dice que más allá de un sistema operativo o dispositivo móvil determinado, la competencia se centrará en ecosistemas, los que se componen de la integración del software, hardware, aplicaciones y servicios dirigidos. Android estaría bien preparado para competir con Apple y RIM, con la capacidad de dar soporte a muchos proveedores claves y a diversos precios. "Entonces, con la cuota de mercado de Symbian decayendo, el que desaparecerá como actor hacia 2012, Android se beneficiará y llenará los espacios de mercado que hayan quedado libres", asegura la analista.


Otra de las características que convierten al sistema operativo estrella de Google en el preferido por las compañías, es su flexibilidad. "Los mercados de Apple y RIM también están creciendo, debido a que poseen una oferta integrada (software y hardware en un mismo producto), pero controlan completamente sus ecosistemas y le dan al consumidor un ciclo de actualización más tranquilo. Con Android existe una mayor flexibilidad al ser de código abierto, aunque significa también mayor fragmentación y hojas de ruta menos claras", dice Cozza.


Asimismo, la especialista indica que dado que el aumento en el uso de teléfonos inteligentes, así como la sofisticación de las funcionalidades de los sistemas operativos, la forma en cómo accedemos e interactuamos con el contenido online ha cambiado, lo que motivará a las compañías a crear extensiones de sus estrategias de negocios que sean replicables a través de estos dispositivos. Por lo mismo, Cozza sostiene que "el hecho de que la interfaz de usuario de los teléfonos inteligentes, su sistema operativo y ecosistema estén impulsando otras categorías de dispositivos como son los media tablets, significará que las aplicaciones móviles migrarán y tendrán que ser usables a través de diversos aparatos, sin limitarse a los teléfonos inteligentes, para darle al usuario una experiencia consistente".


En tanto, desde una perspectiva corporativa, se prevee que el mercado continuará dominado por marcas como RIM, que poseen un público cautivo. Sin ir más lejos, durante el 4Q de 2010 la compañía vendió aproximadamente 14,9 millones de smartphones. Incluso, y a pesar de que Nokia lideró durante el año pasado en Europa, Oriente Medio y África, RIM la desplazó en América Latina, donde envió más de 1 millón de teléfonos más que la gigante finlandesa. De hecho, sus teléfonos inteligentes de rango medio como la BlackBerry Curve, se constituyerons como un acierto para el posicionamiento de la marca en la región.


En términos de ventas globales, IDC asegura que los marcas pondrán en el mercado unos 450 millones de teléfonos inteligentes, en comparación a los 303,4 millones de dispositivos que se comercializaron durante el 2010. El mercado de teléfonos inteligentes crecería incluso cuatro veces más rápido que el mercado tradicional de telefonía móvil, en la medida que los consumidores finales y corporativos migren hacia este tipo de dispositivos en búsqueda de aplicaciones más avanzadas.

Un aspecto importante es que la masificación de la telefonía móvil también implica que el negocio del software ya no se limita al mercado corporativo, de negocios o instituciones públicas o privadas: ahora se trata del consumidor final, un campo infinitamente más grande. Los que lo han entendido, lo liderarán. Y esto tiene que ver con la segunda nota.

Nuevas reflexiones sobre el software futuro

La semana pasada hubo un gran revuelo en la comunidad de usuarios de Silverlight. En su PDC2010 (Professional Developers Conference 2010, finales de octubre), Bob Muglia y Steve Ballmer hicieron comentarios que indujeron a pensar a distintos observadores que Silverlight pasaba a una vía muerta. Mary Jo Foley publicó un artículo que corrió como la pólvora, y desató toda clase de especulaciones que todavía duran. Aunque el tema de por sí es muy interesante, en este caso deberá quedar para otra oportunidad. Está por verse si realmente Siverlight pasa a mejor vida, o el revuelo proviene de un torpe manejo de relaciones públicas (dicho sea de paso, el post del blog de Siverlight que acompañó al anuncio, y que se convirtió en un muro de los lamentos, todavía no ha tenido una respuesta clara y definitiva de parte de sus autores, a cinco días de emitido). En fin, lo que particularmente me atrajo en este caso, fue el tipo de discusión que generó: una vivísima representación del estado de la construcción del software en ésta época. Lo que sigue es una lista de asuntos de primera importancia que fueron discutidos. Todos los comentarios siguientes son respuestas al post de Bob Muglia en el sitio de Silverlight. Al fin de cada párrafo se indica el nom de guerre que cada usuario prefirió usar. Hay mucho más material en otros sitios que generaron respuestas, otros interesados con blog propio, comentarios de periodistas de tecnología, etc. Quizá más adelante se agregue algo de esto.

Múltiples dispositivos y plataformas, no más un ambiente cerrado y confortable
Uno de los temas de mayor preocupación reflejados es el de la cobertura del producto respecto de dispositivos crecientemente heterogéneos, no sólo escritorio: mientras sus seguidores esperarían la ampliación de Silverlight "al menos" a Android, si algo dejan claro, es que para el producto, sólo hay planes para Windows Phone 7. Claramente, el mundo ha devenido heterogéneo y no monoproducto:

I'm in a project where we have to make a decision between Silverlight and HTML5. We were leaning toward Silverlight, but then put the brakes on when we heard about the comments from the PDC. This blog post doesn't help Silverlight's case. It merely looks like you're trying to calm a panic. But the reality is that anyone deciding on Silverlight vs HTML5 for new applications, that will be supported years down the road, must seriously consider jumping into HTML5 as the safer path. Clearly you've admitted it's the best path for cross platform applications. In an iPad, Android, Windows and everything else world we are flying toward... how can we *not* pick HTML5. (Dave Friedel)

To rectify this, I need to see an announcement that Silverlight will be ported to Android. Flash has. Yes, an iPhone port won't happen bc Apple policy, but Android is shipping on more phones and is more likely to be used by business people than iPhone. WP7 is starting from too small a base to invest in significant development. Right now develop for iPhone bc it's got the buzz, Android bc it's got the momentum, and then WP7 if and when resources allow. An Android port of Silverlight means develop for Android/WP7 first which further deflates iPhone momentum. Think strategically. (Anónimo)


I understand that porting it to iPhone is beyond Microsoft's reach and depends primarily on Apple , but it would be nice to get it ported to Android. No one expects you guys to cover all of the platforms with SL, but it would be nice to cover the most popular ones.(Nick Polyak)


Your competitior isn't backing away from taking its technology to popular platforms - they're finding ways to reward developers and designers for their continued support and loyalty by making sure they have a path to run everywhere that's relevant. There's no questioning their commitment, and yet questions persist about yours. (Anónimo)

Basically you're saying that it's not a battle you want to fight, so you're giving up altogether. I don't think everyone expected Silverlight to be on every device. Heck, the top 10 would be more than enough to satisfy nearly everyone out there (including devices your company controls and owns, such as Windows, Zune/WP7 and XBox).
HTML5 certainly hasn't had a problem with adoption on several devices. Heck, even Android (an entire OS) hasn't. So why is Silverlight having such a challenge in doing it? (Daniel)


I've been building a website over the past 2 years that incorporates 20,000+ lines of Silverlight on the client side (and yes, it really does need to be that complex.). I've been completely trusting Microsoft's commitment to this platform, but I'm now very very worried indeed. I've just spent all weekend learning GWT, and I'm starting to think a port might actually be plausible. Bob's blog post really seems nothing more than a half-assed effort at damage control, and I'm afraid that where there's smoke there's probably fire.
This time last week, I was silverlight's greatest fan. But unless you do a *lot* more to restore my confidence, I'm planning to spend the next month seeing how far I can get in migrating to GWT. I can't quite understand why you think this is a good thing for Microsoft. (ArcMan)

I'd like to see Silverlight and the Metro UI phone/tablet interface integrated tightly into Windows 8 the way iOS is being integrated into OSX Lion.

Microsoft should utilize Windows Phone 7 and the Silverlight implementation to create an install base of developers who can then populate a mobile, desktop, tablet, and web app store. It only makes sense then to include license options for apps that run across the different mediums the Silverlight can hit.
I think anyone who doesn't see Silverlight as an LOB/media tool is missing the boat. I would never build a website in Silverlight. I would build my media viewer or my backend system though. I would definitely build an app on Silverlight. (CKLuis)


" As a result, getting a single runtime implementation installed on every potential device is practically impossible. " [conceptos de Bob Muglia en su post]
It's absolutely possible, and moreover that's exactly what must be done. You can have platform specific extensions of course, but core must be the same for all platforms. And if you cannot implement SilverLight runtime for all possible devices, just open source it, and it will be ported to any "potential" device in few months, and we won't need to even listen this meaningless statements how "cool" HTML5 is. (Sipank)

As a .NET/XAML programmer I've been very disappointed that I can't target one of Microsoft's popular platforms, the XBOX 360. It has been difficult to understand this glaring omission, but Scott Barnes' explanation as to the internal unpopularity of WPF sure seemed to make a lot of sense. For the immediate future, say the next five years, these are the relevant platforms...

Windows
Mac
iPhone
Droid
WP7
XBOX
Playstation

You're already on three of the seven. After watching you guys for years supporting NT on x86, Alpha, and x64, you can't convince me that you can't easily port a 5MB runtime to four more platforms. The tools and silverlight groups have done AMAZING work, to "shift" strategies now would truly be grabbing defeat from the jaws of victory. I imagine your partners like Netflix would be delighted if they never had to do another port again and could rely on Silverlight. Seriously, if Sun and their grotesquely incompetent programmers were able to port java to so many platforms, you guys should at least be able to get it on seven. (Jack Bond)

I see silverlight as a better and lighter version of desktop runtime in replacing wpf which is so heavy and hard to deploy to people who don't have the latest runtime.
I found that even without html 5, the current javascript + html4 + css enable people to build much prettier and user friendly UI. Silverlight follows a desktop UI philosophy and doesn't really fit into the browser except some case of advertising oriented banner... (collaboration cloud)

Do what should have been done in the first place - make Silverlight compile down to a html5 compliant web application. You know, sorta like how GWT does it. Write java, get all the benefits of it, but it produces minimized, best practice compiled javascript.

I think MS took the fight against 'Flex', and by the time it was ready, realized they missed the train because Apple and Google are attacking the web pieces, meanwhile MS went backwards and is now sitting in the same 'yucky' spot as Adobe.

Making browser plugin's is yesterday's technology.

Actually, what is odd, is that the MS team used Script# to build the online Office - not Silverlight - that alone should tell you the status of Silverlight. Wake up people. MS should be investing in Script#, not Silverlight. (Steve)


The community will definetly like to see silverlight ported to more platforms. How commited are you to making silverlight cross platform? (Arson)

When you buy a PC or a car, you own it. You are free to use it the way you like and you can install any extension/software you want without asking the manufacturer. The mobile phone market is different. Think of it as a car you paid for in cash, however every year you have to pay a license fee and for every drive you have to pay-per-use for the steering wheel. Not to mention the payment for the manufacturer's OK for 3rd party tires... This is exactly the Apple business model for the iPad/iPhone. You buy it, yet Apple owns it/controls its usage.
Now Microsoft obviously failed in coming up with a similar or competing business model. Option a) entering the hardware market, controlling the devices, with full power offends all hardware partners and option b) controlling the application market through a license check in the SL runtime fails, because Silverlight (legally) cannot be installed at the majority of mobile devices.
(...)

So dear fellow developers, this is not about SL, this is about losing the first big battle on the mobile phone operating theatre. We're the collateral damage.

Microsoft has enough cash for scraping another phone platform; happened early this summer didn't it? However what about you and me?
And I hope: Microsoft buys Nokia. (Hidden War)

Los lenguajes y arquitecturas propietarias son un escollo
Un tema que subyace en la preocupación de varios de los reclamantes, es la necesidad (aceptada o no, da lo mismo en este caso) de adaptarse a estándares concertados, dado que "el mundo es ancho y ajeno":

What we have here is a fundamental conflict between the desire for standards (although how anyone can call HTML a standard is beyond me since even simple stuff renders differently in different browsers) versus the desire for productivity. Given enough time, resources, and patience, you could create and maintain just about any piece of software using just about any environment and tools. However, creating increasingly complex RIAs with the brain dead HTML/CSS/Javascript/4 million libraries stack strains the time constraints and resource that companies have and exceeds the patience of professional developers used to working with even modestly productive development environments. Silverlight should be more correctly call Silverbullet because it massively overdelivers on the productivity and capability needed to create RIAs. If standards are a problem, why not just turn the future definition Silverlight over to a standards body like Netscape did with Javascript and whoever did with HTML? Then the standards people would have their objections undercut and those of us who actually do development could get on with our work. (Bryan Morris)


Perhaps MS should consider releasing a lightweight SL runtime for low power handheld devices. This make great sense, because these small screen interfaces normally use fancy animations with just a minimal input control set, and a lightweight runtime would allow MS to easily port SL to a large number of low power devices.
The apparent problem now is that SL is rather weighted with features -- many of which are appropriate only in larger screen environs, and this limits the potential device audience. This is likely why WP7 required a more robust engine. Perhaps a simple solution would be to offer WP7 with the full runtime, but publish lightweight runtimes for the rest of the mobile universe. This would give WP7 a control set edge, and at the same time, would allow most (efficiently coded) apps to cover the bulk of the device universe.
The iPhone and other market-significant proprietary boxes will quite likely be pressed by market forces or lawsuits into support other runtimes, such as Flash and SL. A lightweight runtime option makes SL more palatable to these vendors, since they wish to protect product performance perceptions, but at the same, wish to enjoy revenues from app sales. (Handled device suggestion)


Silverlight is not and never will be the one tool to use for all situations but it continues to be a very useful tool for many situations.
I'm typing this on a iPad and so I cant use many of my own Silverlight apps in the same way that Flash isn't available to me.
After lunch I'll go back to my desk and continue to work on my current Silverlight project which is the best tool for that particular project and environment with some support software being written in MVC2 for the web.
To get angry for being told Silverlight won't run on iPads and some other environments is madness, we already know this. If you want to hit every environment, use an open standard like H5 and accept the limitations that come with it. Judge on a project by project basis. (kaseciu pildymas)


I understand your point and your choice of client side technology is the most reasonable choice given the platforms you are targetting. However that does change nothing about Javascript not being suitable for complex client application development. I believe that the main reason for the choice has nothing to do with Javascript qualities as a language and development technology rather than the simple fact that Javascript is available on all those platforms and Silverlight is not. And I believe you would seriously consider Silverlight or other technology based on statically typed language, full cross-browser and cross-platform compatibility etc. if it was supported on all those platforms.
My understanding of Microsoft's message is "we are not able to put Silverlight on every platform so we are moving to HTML5/Javascript". And my fear is that it will slow down and with time maybe even stop Silverlight development and expansion because Microsoft "already has a strategy to get you everywhere" so why invest to Silverlight. Or at very least "why invest to Silverlight in a pace like last years", which is also disappointing.
HTML5 is a must have, there is no doubt about it, but it should not affect Silverlight in any way. (Martin)


I am not sure why so many people blame Microsoft for their commitment to Silverlight. It was quite clear from the beginning that Silverlight will be only available for Windows platform. I don't think this decision changed to much. If you stick with Widows platform you will be fine in any case. If you wanted to have a cross platform solution Silverlight was never a good choose or did some of you naively think that it will be ported to other platforms? (Aleximo)


I commited our development team and reputation to Silverlight. And now I have been left high and dry ! I am not really convinced by this Blog Post. The message is out there, Microsoft is adopting HTML5 in preference to developing Silverlight further. Microsoft are just going to let Silverlight die, after a couple more weak releases. Shopw me the Silverlight Roadmap for the next 5 years, on the Main Microsoft.com page, and maybe you will convince the Developer and their bosses that we have all not just adopted a turky technology.
I should have learn't from the J++ experiment.
I will never trust MS again. (No longer trust Microsoft)

I think some of you are missing the big picture. Whether or not Silverlight's direction has "shifted" or whether or not HTML5 is a full replacement is tangential at best to the point Bob made in his original quote.
Many of you have been saying Silverlight is "cross platform". If we were in the 90s, this would be right, it covers multiple browsers on the two largest operating systems.
Bob's comments are simple: web development is not about cross browsers, and it's definitely not about two operating systems. The ecosystem of web applications on a broad scale is widening greatly to include many new OSes, hardware types, form factors, screen sizes, hell even bandwidth assumptions are up in the air at this point.
If you wanted a "cross platform" web site or web application, Silverlight isn't and never was the right answer. The only difference between last week and this week is that Bob pointed out that it is infeasible to port Silverlight to all of these devices, form factors, and platforms. That should have been obvious to anyone knowledgable enough to be on this thread; him saying it is just a rubber stamp on something intuitively true.
This was true last week and it'll be true next week: If you're trying to come up with a desktop application that is loaded through a web interface, and you're okay with only supporting two operating systems, Silverlight will give you some nice bells and whistles for grander application. However, if you're looking to make a truly cross platform web solution, you need to be using HTML and its related standards and technologies. (ChrisC)

El panorama está dado...Hay otros elementos de gran interés, que en todo caso, irán en otro momento. Por ahora es suficiente. Un común denominador entre tantos desarrolladores del ecosistema de productos de Microsoft, es la nula referencia entre todos ellos a herramientas de desarrollo basado en modelos, o al menos, referencias a lenguajes específicos de dominio,  a pesar que durante dos años el tema fue un caballo de batalla de Microsoft. Sin embargo, en el fárrago de lenguajes y arquitecturas, éste debiera ser el punto que les diera perspectiva y tranquilidad ante abruptos cambios de frente o apariciones de nuevas arquitecturas. Un elemento general es el sentido de decepción y vacío, frente a la inversión de horas y dinero, cuando el dueño de un producto los deja solos y sin respuesta. Una estrategia no recomendable, existiendo la alternativa del desarrollo basado en modelos, en el sabor que se desee.

¿Defiende bien su mercado IBM?

Volviendo sobre un comentario anterior, completo lo dicho sobre el gerenciamiento en IBM con un pequeño artículo publicado en The Four Hundered por Hesh Wiener. Quiero aclarar que lo que Wiener afirma allí es de relativa aplicación: comparar el modelo de negocios de Apple o Google con el de IBM no es muy viable desde el punto de vista de la comparación lado a lado de formas de comercialización, (por ejemplo Apple App Store vs Smart Cube), porque los objetivos de uno y otro modelo son muy distintos. IBM forma parte de aquellas empresas que sirven al mercado corporativo o institucional, de empresas, entregando servicios y tecnología, y el mercado de Google o Apple no tienen ese centro primordialmente. Quizá un poco más lo sea para Google, pero poco para Apple, dirigido al mercado de consumo masivo. Otra cosa sería evaluar si globalmente esta orientación fue un acierto, pero esto implicaría quizá entrar a conversar sobre el concepto de la tecnología informática como un commodity, y ese es otro tema.
Salvado el caso, sigue siendo entonces válida la comparación. Y mucho más, si tenemos presente que el giro más importante de IBM, en palabras de su propia dirección, fue el de desplazarse de hardware a servicios. Si eso es así, la crítica es válida:

There are something like 225,000 iPhone programs available for download from the Apple App Store. By contrast, there are only about 10,000 true iPad apps. Google's Android phones have 75,000 apps on tap, more or less. The original Application System, the IBM AS/400, now called the i like Apple products (but easily distinguished by checking sales volume) has a pathetic Web store selling canned systems under the Smart Cube rubric. There are about 80 software packages, but only 26 of them are for the i; the rest are for Intel-based Linux servers. (...) [Las aplicaciones ofrecidas son] software suites that real end-users can put to work after getting a machine and the software and suffering through some training. Most of the stuff on the Smart Cube site is the kind of ERP software that costs five times as much to customize as to buy.

Wiener apunta en dirección de atraer, al modo de Google o Apple, un gran número de desarrolladores que innoven y diversifiquen el software existente para el AS400 (o iSeries, o i ):

But if IBM wants to get i users to run lots more applications, to make their IBM business systems do the zillion things these users now accomplish by pointing their client computers past the local i box and out on the Internet, it has to attract smart developers.

It's easy to declare that the i operating system market (as distinct from Apple's iOS operating system bazaar) is so small that no live wire developer would put in any time building apps for it, but that is obviously silly. If IBM offered development tools that let a developer build apps for i 7.1 and also other environments, such as z/OS and Linux, programmers would show up and show off. If IBM not only helped the developers make a few bucks at this sport, all the better. And if IBM offered payment and prizes for apps that boosted the themes IBM's marketing execs felt were the best Big Blue had to offer--software that ties in with energy conservation or other activities of commercial and social benefit--even more coders would come to the party.

Aunque lo menciona, quisiera resaltar un punto: no sólo se trata de una oferta más rica, variada e innovadora  de aplicaciones, sino también de su precio (Most of the stuff on the Smart Cube site is the kind of ERP software that costs five times as much to customize as to buy). El mercado del AS400 y otros sistemas de IBM han crecido y evolucionado bajo la idea de que se debe obtener retorno de un número limitado de ventas. Lo que Wiener propone es invertir la ecuación: trabajar en un modelo de menores costos pero mayor número de ventas. Y esta es una cuestión vital...

While the hardest thing for IBM to do, notwithstanding its former motto Think, is to re-think, IBMers who want long careers really have no other choice. The Lazarus mainframe trick might work some more but with every reprise the odds shift against it. Same goes for the milk-the-base tactics of IBM's i management.

It's life-or-death for IBM these days, and maybe for the whole Western computer industry. If the legacy companies in the computer business don't learn from the best ideas of Apple, Google, Amazon, eBay, and Microsoft, they are goners. They are not just going to hop onto the next good economic wave and surf into the future. If the leaders of the recent past don't engage the best and brightest in the countries that bore them and gave them generations of sustenance, they not only condemn their nations to the forces that turned Rome into Italy, they will condemn themselves, too.

Adhiero a lo que Bridget van Kralingen destacaba como valores de IBM: no solo ha sido precursora, sino que mucho, demasiado de lo que se ha hecho en tecnología informática es debido a su labor innovadora y de investigación, tanto en el desarrollo del hardware, como en el de soporte teórico, sistemas operativos y software en general, sin mencionar su apoyo en los últimos años al desarrollo Open Source. Sería lamentable que su valor se convirtiera en historia.

Cambios radicales en la industria del software (Microsoft asediado, III)

Henry Blodget, en Forbes, hablando del futuro de Microsoft, apunta algunos de los notables cambios que se producen y se extenderán en años próximos en la industria del software. No toda la industria es lo que estos cambios implican, pero sin duda le darán otra fisonomía, probablemente muy distinta de la actual. El mercado del software se ha ampliado, de tal forma que abarca casi cualquier área económica o social. La universalización de la telefonía móvil y la aparición de nuevos recursos (Kindle, por caso) ha hecho entrar al uso del software a una gigantesca masa de usuarios, de intereses completamente diversos. El modelo de la computación de escritorio se diluye a pasos de gigante, y aún las aplicaciones corporativas, más conservadoras, están al borde de un cambio de similares proporciones. Quien no advierta y se adecue a esto, perderá su posición, y ese parece ser el caso de Microsoft:

Could Microsoft Collapse?
Don't mean to be alarmist, but the odds are increasing that Microsoft's business will just completely collapse.
A few weeks ago, the market delivered its verdict on the relative future prospects of Apple and Microsoft.
Apple's prospects are better, the market said. And in the past few weeks, that vote has only become more decisive.
Could Apple collapse? Not likely, analyst argues
The market still thinks Microsoft's long-term prospects are pretty good, though. The stock is trading at a respectable 14X P/E. The company has cash flow gushing out of its ears. The consensus is that Microsoft will keep growing, just more slowly.
But the odds are increasing that even this will prove to be wishful thinking.
Before we begin, a quick review of where Microsoft's revenue and profits come from.
Microsoft has a lot of different businesses, but as you can see from the chart below, the vast majority of its profits come from Windows and Office.

And now on to Microsoft's predicament...
The world has changed radically in the past few years. The Internet has continued to free app-makers from dependency on Windows or any other desktop platform (and, thus, from dependency on Microsoft). Apple's iPhone has revolutionized the mobile business, unleashing a whole new wave of personal computing devices. Apple's iPad seems on its way to supplanting the low-end PC business.
Importantly, none of these trends depend in any way on Microsoft's original monopoly and cash cow, Windows. None of these trends generate so much as a dollar of revenue or profit for Microsoft. (Microsoft is nowhere in mobile. Or tablets. And it is reasonable to think that, in these two huge growth businesses, nowhere is where Microsoft will always be).
Google, meanwhile, is trying to do the same thing to Apple that Microsoft did to Apple 15 years ago: Separate software and hardware and create a ubiquitous software platform for the world's developers to build on. This is a smart strategy, and it's resonating in the developer and consumer communities: Google's Android and Chrome started slow, but they're gaining momentum rapidly. What's more, Google is not just undercutting the alternatives on price--it's giving away its products for free.
Once again, the Chrome/Android momentum has nothing to do with Windows. Once again, it doesn't benefit Microsoft in any way.
Now take a look at what Microsoft's biggest Windows customers--Dell, HP, and the other big PC manufacturers--are up to. Dell is in talks with Google to begin developing devices designed to run Chrome (and who can blame it--if it doesn't do this, it will be left behind in the next wave of consumer devices). And HP just bought the wreckage of Palm so that it would have a better mobile operating system with which to compete against Apple. From Microsoft's perspective, these last two developments are disasters.

The Future Will Be PC-Centric? Only In Microsoft's Dreams
As recently as a few years ago, Microsoft was still arguing that the future would be Windows-centric. Sure, there would be millions of connected devices, the company said, but they would all orbit around the desktop PC, which would remain the center of the personal tech universe (and, thus, remain an ongoing source of immense "platform" profits). The explosive uptake of iPhones, iPads, and Android-based devices is increasingly making this view seem preposterous.
The desktop PC isn't the center of anyone's universe anymore. The Internet is. And the Internet doesn't require Windows.
In fact, it's not hard to envision a future in which the "desktop PC," as Microsoft currently defines it, becomes an oddity--a strange throwback to a world in which a single local hard drive (or a box of floppy disks) constituted the center of someone's work life.
(Consider the absurdity in today's world of syncing a mobile device with a single desktop PC. What about all your other devices? What about the inconvenient location and single-point-of-failure of that single PC? Why not just sync that PC--and every other device you own--with the cloud! You don't need a fancy operating system to do that).
In short, the monopoly "platform" characteristics that have protected Windows all these years are completely breaking down. The PC's relative importance in the world of personal technology is dwindling, and Microsoft has not been able to transfer Windows to other platforms. Google will soon be offering a free alternative for remaining PC-like devices, which, at the very least, will put pressure on Microsoft's margins.
Add all that together, and there's basically nothing good to say about the future of the Windows platform.

And Now On To Office
And then there's Office, the other huge source of Microsoft's profits.
Google has launched an Internet-centric version of Office: Google Apps. For now, Google Apps is inferior to Office for everything except collaboration. But it has all the hallmarks of a classic disruptive technology.
Specifically, Google Apps is cheaper, easier, and more convenient to use than Microsoft Office. How do we know this? Because Google Apps is taking over the low-end of the market. Google Apps is also steadily improving its features and migrating toward the middle of the market, which is what disruptive technologies do. And it is already causing Microsoft to have to offer its own free Internet-based version of Office and cut the price of its latest version of desktop one to remain competitive.
(Pause for a moment and consider that: The only way Microsoft can compete with the free version of Google Apps is to offer a free version of Microsoft Office to match it. Even if Microsoft Office were indisputably superior to Google Apps, which not one review we've read has suggested, how is that going to help Microsoft preserve its massive Office profits?)
Big companies are starting to ditch Microsoft Office for Google Apps. If this becomes a trend, Microsoft's second huge cash cow will be under immediate threat.
When will that happen?
Maybe not this year or next year. But in all likelihood soon.

So, Remind Us Again What There Is To Be Excited About In Microsoft's Future?
So, Remind Us Again What There Is To Be Excited About In Microsoft's Future?
Take another look at the chart of Microsoft's operating profit. The vast, vast majority of that profit comes from two businesses that are under aggressive attack.
What's more, Microsoft has no obvious way to parry that attack.
One of its two huge competitors, Apple, is miles ahead of it in the growth of the most exciting and fastest-growing segment of the market, mobile devices. The other--Google--is giving away its competitive products for free. Microsoft will NEVER be able to do that.
(Analysts are applauding and stomping their feet for the 4 percentage points of search market share Microsoft has clawed back in the past year. What they're overlooking is how much Microsoft has PAID to gain those share points. The odds are that Microsoft will never be able to build a large, profitable search business of any kind, let alone one that could fund a complete transformation of its business model into giving away Windows and Office for free.)
Right now, the investors are concluding that Microsoft will gradually become the equivalent of a technology utility--a boring but necessary provider of the software that runs the world's business community. A smaller, more optimistic crowd is still arguing that, one day, Microsoft will be able to turn its fortunes around, and fight its way back into an industry leadership position.
What almost no one is talking about is a third possibility, one that becomes more likely by the day: The possibility that, a couple of years down the road, Microsoft's business may just completely collapse.

El panorama futuro probablemente encuentre actores muy diferentes. Quizá el papel dominante de los grandes competidores de hoy (que han cambiado ya: ¿quién hubiera dado dos centavos por Apple y Amazon hace diez años?) ocupe otro espacio en el futuro: las infraestructuras de la nube, los servicios que la habiliten, y la consultoría; y quizá quede espacio amplio para una variada oferta, tan variada como los recursos a los que irá a atender. En ese panorama, creo que, más aún, habrá un lugar de importancia fundamental para las herramientas que permitan desarrollar a un nivel suficiente de abstracción, como para aislarse de la Babel que se nos viene.

Microsoft asediado, II

A propósito del avance de Apple sobre Microsoft, Brian Caulfield, en Forbes, pone el acento en lo que parece el centro del problema para Microsoft: su adaptación al cambio del mercado tecnológico:

In 1997 a struggling Apple turned to rival Microsoft for help, and Microsoft invested $150 million into the company and brought its Office desktop productivity software to the Mac.

On Wednesday, Apple's market capitalization surpassed that of Microsoft, making the once-struggling Cupertino, Calif., computer company the most valuable technology company on Earth. And that's just the latest sign of a question that has been whispered about in Silicon Valley for months now: Is Microsoft irrelevant?

Microsoft Chief Steve Ballmer certainly seems to think something's wrong. On Tuesday, after getting beaten first by Apple and then Google's smartphone efforts, the Redmond, Wash., software company shook up its entertainment and devices business.

Robbie Bach, who led Microsoft's entertainment and device division, which includes mobile devices, is out. Now it's up to Andy Lees, who will report directly to Ballmer, to get Microsoft back into a market that's the biggest growth story in technology right now--smartphones.

It won't be easy. Microsoft's software is used on just 7% of smartphones, according to tech tracker Gartner. Nokia's Symbian and Research In Motion dominate the market. Apple, with 15% of the market, and Google, with 10%, are growing quickly.

Microsoft, to be sure, still ships hundreds of millions of copies of Windows a year. Microsoft, however, is getting crushed in the smartphone business. "That's where the action is," says Mat Rosoff, an analyst with market research firm Directions On Microsoft.

Microsoft saw this coming first. The problem? Its grip on business desktops didn't give it a lock on smartphones. "Instead of dictating to workers what kind of phones they'd be using, workers came to IT and said 'Can you support my iPhone?'"

Worse yet for Microsoft is the software powering those smartphones poses a threat to Windows. The mobile version of Apple's OS X that powers the iPhone has been a hit in Apple's iPad.

Hewlett-Packard--a longtime Microsoft customer--will do the same with the WebOS software it is acquiring with Palm. "That starts to cut away at the bottom end of the Microsoft Windows business," Rosoff says.

More devices are on the way from China, where upstart smartphone makers are building $99 devices around Google's Android operating system.

So is Microsoft irrelevant? No. Do you have to go through Microsoft to get a piece of the fastest growing market in tech? Absolutely not. And that's why Microsoft is no longer the most valuable company in technology.

Completando el panorama, Android sobrepasa las ventas de IPhone en China, el mayor mercado potencial futuro.

Microsoft: liderazgo cuestionado

La noticia exagera un poco el hecho, ya que la cotización en bolsa de un día no significa necesariamente que esa valuación se mantendrá, digamos, la semana que viene, especialmente en un marco volátil como el de estos dias. Pero el hecho que New York Times (Miguel Helft y Ashlee Vance) destaca hoy, es simbólico: hoy Apple superó el valor de bolsa de Microsoft:

In intraday trading in the afternoon session, Apple shares rose 1.8 percent, which gave the company a value of $227.1 billion. Shares of Microsoft declined about 1 percent, giving the company a market capitalization of $226.3 billion.

The only American company valued higher is Exxon Mobil, with a market capitalization of $282 billion.

La noticia se suma a la reorganización de algunas áreas de Microsoft, y la salida de dos importantes ejecutivos (Robbie Bach y J. Allard). Es una cuestión de adecuación y reacción a los requerimientos actuales del mercado. Dice NYTimes:

This changing of the guard caps one of the most stunning turnarounds in business history, as Apple had been given up for dead only a decade earlier. But the rapidly rising value attached to Apple by investors also heralds a cultural shift: Consumer tastes have overtaken the needs of business as the leading force shaping technology.

Microsoft, with its Windows and Office software franchises, has dominated the relationship most people had with their computers for almost two decades and that was reflected in its stock market capitalization. But the click-clack of the keyboard has ceded ground to the swoosh of a finger across a smartphone’s touch-screen.

Si bien probablemente Microsoft seguirá adelante, estos son signos claros de su inadecuación al estado de la industria...

Internet: cambiando el modelo de negocios

José Mendiola en El Confidencial:

Salió victorioso en la llamada 'guerra de los formatos', un pulso en el que el ganador tomaría el testigo dejado por el DVD como rey de lo audiovisual. Sin embargo, aquella victoria puede resultar efímera de confirmarse la tendencia del mercado. Muchas sombras se ciernen sobre una contienda en la que el derrotado fue el HD DVD de Microsoft, y nunca estuvieron claros los motivos que decantaron la balanza a favor de uno y no del otro, ya que técnicamente ambos formatos eran muy similares.

Allanado el camino, cualquiera hubiera podido pensar que Blu-ray, auspiciado por Sony, viviría momentos de esplendor, haciendo caja y amortizando los elevados costes de desarrollo. Pero nada más lejos de la realidad: presente en el mercado desde mediados de junio de 2006, el sistema no acaba de cuajar entre los usuarios y, de hecho, se empiezan a notar síntomas de estancamiento en las ventas que han hecho saltar las alarmas entre los fabricantes que comercializan dicho formato.

‘Muerto’ por la expansión de la banda ancha
¿Qué está ocurriendo? Microsoft y Sony se enzarzaron en una guerra por determinar el formato que sustituiría al DVD, pero omitieron un cambio esencial en el mercado: la propagación de la banda ancha estaba provocando una nueva cultura del entretenimiento, en la que los usuarios se descargan lo que quieren ver y escuchar a demanda. No se trata de considerar a todo usuario como un pirata, sino que somos testigos de un cambio de hábito que puede verse ya en mercados como el estadounidense.
En aquel país pueden ya comprarse películas y series en la tienda de Apple (iTunes), o bien servicios de videoclub en streaming como Netflix, donde cada cliente -por unos 9 dólares al mes- puede descargar a demanda las películas que desee y visionarlas cuando lo crea conveniente. En nuestro país, lo más cercano a este servicio podemos encontrarlo en las cadenas de pago a través de las taquillas, pero su uso está limitado al escaso número de abonados que pagan una elevada cuota por ello.

Apple no quiere Blu-ray
Este cambio de filosofía de consumir a demanda podría ser uno de los motivos por los que precisamente Apple renuncia de forma sistemática a incorporar Blu-ray en sus equipos. ¿Qué necesidad hay de introducir un nuevo formato audiovisual cuando el usuario puede descargarse el contenido de forma on-line? Hay que entender que desde el punto de vista del consumidor, las descargas son mucho más atractivas: no es necesario desplazarse al videoclub (y por partida doble: recoger y devolver), no hay que esperar a que el estreno que se desea ver está libre, no se requiere hacer una inversión en un lector específico y se entiende que al no haber un soporte físico, el coste del alquiler de la película debería ser inferior.

Ante este panorama, se presenta incierto el futuro del Blu-ray y no tanto porque pueda esperarse que no llegue a sobrevivir, sino porque no va a disfrutar de la eclosión y florecimiento que vivieron los formatos audiovisuales predecesores (a saber, VHS y DVD). Este formato encontrará un buen nicho de mercado entre los coleccionistas y los amantes del cine en alta definición. Precisamente los defensores de Blu-ray no comparten este oscuro horizonte del formato, y aseguran que el DVD tuvo también unos inicios timoratos hasta que finalmente se asentó en el mercado. Este wishful thinking no parece contar, sin embargo, con el apoyo de varios fabricantes de televisores, que están ya dotando a sus terminales de conexión de banda ancha para la visualización on-line de películas en alta definición.

Desde Hollywood se observa este cambio de tendencia con gran preocupación, hasta el punto que muchas productoras intentan poner palos en la rueda a la descarga on-line dando prioridad de hasta un mes en los estrenos a los DVD, en una medida que nos suena más a acción desesperada que a una decisión estratégica.

El estancamiento del formato Blu-ray es otro síntoma más de cómo la mejora del ancho de banda, así como la universalización del acceso a Internet y el crecimiento de la "computación en la nube" (cloudcomputing), están alterando los habitos y las posibilidades del lado del usuario final, así como los actores y recursos, del lado de la oferta.
Publicado un día después de que también se anunciara oficialmente la entrada de Google al mercado de "telefonía" móvil.

Los gigantes de IT mandan en bolsa

Publicado por R.J. Lapetra en Cotizalia, la valoración de bolsa de los gigantes tecnológicos americanos da en buena medida un balance del 2009, y una perspectiva del 2010:

Es su tiempo. Por encima de cualquier otro sector empresarial, la última década ha visto la confirmación de la tecnología informática y de internet como pieza angular de la economía y de los mercados. Ni bancos, ni farmacéuticas, ni telecomunicaciones... Las grandes tecnológicas se han convertido en los nuevos gigantes de la bolsapuntocom purgase los excesos a principios de la década y el credit crunch de 2007 pusiese a prueba la solidez de sus balances y negocio. Y han salido de ellas con la vítola de ganadoras.
después de que la crisis de las

Microsoft, Google, Apple, IBM y Oracle se presentan ante el 2010 como cinco colosos en la generación de beneficios y una gran posición de caja (efectivo disponible), que les sitúa en posición compradora de otras empresas. Teniendo en cuenta el tamaño de sus cinco mayores empresas -una medida utilizada habitualmente para medir el nivel de concentración y peso de un sector- este Top 5 tecnológico alcanza un valor en bolsa de 900.000 millones de dólares, que rivaliza ya con el tradicional dominador, las petroleras (Exxon, Chevron, PetroChina, RD Shell y Total) con más de un Billón de dólares.

En 2009 han vivido un momento dulce en bolsa con subidas espectaculares que van desde el 40% de Oracle hasta el 150% de Apple, pasando por el 102% de Google, o cerca del 60% de Microsoft e IBM. Si se extiende la vista a la última década, Microsoft sólo se ha revalorizado un 14%, un 55% IBM y un 140% Oracle. En el caso de Google y Apple, su escalada bursátil se sitúa en el 470% y 1.270%, respectivamente, desde el año 2000.

Hasta ahora cada una de ellas dominaba un área de actividad. Pero la convergencia de medios y negocios en red les lleva a enfrentarse irremediablemente. Así, la pugna que mantienen la Microsoft de Bill Gates y Steve Ballmer contra el Google de Serguei Brin y Larry Page adquiere tintes bélicos. Su campo de batalla se alarga: búsquedas (Bing vs Google search), navegadores (Explorer vs Chrome), sistemas operativos (Windows vs Android-Chrome), ofimática (Outlook-MS Office vs Gmail-Docs)... En juego, una tarta de ingresos de 100.000 millones de dólares/año.

Las cifras en que se mueven estas compañías comienzan a calificarse como "planetarias", precisamente, porque sus negocios se extienden por todos los países del planeta. "Tienen muchísimas menos barreras de entrada" que industrias tradicionales, explican fuentes del sector. La suma de ingresos de Microsoft, Oracle, IBM, Google y Apple se elevará en 2009 por encima de los 240.000 millones de dólares con un beneficio neto superior a los 40.000 millones.

La recurrencia de estas ganancias les ha llevado a acumular fuertes posiciones de tesorería que están destinando a la compra continua de empresas. La operación más grande en 2009 ha sido la compra de Sun Microsystems por Oracle, que dejó plantada a IBM; si bien el mercado ha prestado más atención a la alianza a largo plazo entre Microsoft y Yahoo!, así como las pequeñas compras de Google como adMob. También ha resucitado la actividad bursátil con la reciente OPV de la histórica America Online (AOL) o la venta del 65% de Skype a un grupo de inversores privados por parte de la casa de subastas eBay.

Y la batalla de 2010 será en la nube: cloud computing

En este selecto club de empresas aspiran a entrar otras candidatas igualmente potentes como la pujante Amazon.com, la pionera del comercio electrónico y una de las cotizadas más antiguas. La web fundada por Jeff Bezos es hoy uno los principales jugadores de la tecnología que ya está cambiando las reglas de juego: el cloud computing o computación en nube, que permite la construcción rápida de herramientas, servicios y sitios web con módulos prefabricados y servidores virtuales sin necesidad de tener los recursos en red o el equipo de desarrollo.

Según fuentes del sector, este negocio emergente se presenta como el más apetitosos para las sin necesidad de tener una infraestructura física, ni de profesionales de desarrollo. Así en poco tiempo han brotado gigantes como Twitter o Facebook, capaces de albergar a cientos de millones de usuarios y batir en audiencia a sitios intocables como Google, la página más usada del planeta.

Amazon se ha convertido en una de las líderes de la nube con su filial Amazon Web Services, pero otros gigantes apuestan por destronarle como IBM, que sigue enfocada en los servicios a compañías desde que dejó el negocio de PCs -tras venderselo a Lenovo-, o Microsoft (Azure). Y Google (Enterprise) se ha planteado este negocio como prioridad y prevé que suponga hasta un tercio de sus ingresos en el medio plazo cuando ahora representa menos del 5%.

Según fuentes del sector, estas previsiones tempranas estiman que este mercado podría suponer en dos o tres años más de 50.000 millones de dólares. Un negocio -el de alquilar, comprar y vender recursos y alojamiento virtual- que ha despertado el olfato de algunos inversores, que preven que los bits se conviertan durante la próxima década en un activo cotizado y en una nueva materia prima tal que la electricidad, el petróleo, el cobre o el oro.

Windows en nueva época, II

Más claramente que lo que la nota de Rory Cellan-Jones sugiere, Daniel Lyons escribe en Newsweek sobre los cambios en el modelo de negocios en la industria del software, en aquello que ha afectado el predominio de Microsoft:

Last month Microsoft rolled out Windows 7 and opened the first of a chain of new retail stores. As usual with such announcements, there's been loads of hoopla and ginned-up excitement. But mostly people are just relieved. Windows 7 replaces Vista, one of the most disastrous tech products ever. It also caps the end of a decade in which Microsoft's founder, Bill Gates, stepped aside, and the company lost its edge.
Ten years ago, when Gates appointed his longtime second in command, Steve Ballmer, as his replacement as CEO, Microsoft was still the meanest, mightiest tech company in the world, a juggernaut that bullied friends and foes alike and which possessed an operating-system franchise that was practically a license to print money.

[...] That was then. Now, instead of being scary, Microsoft has become a bit of a joke. Yes, its Windows operating system still runs on more than 90 percent of PCs, and the Office application suite rules the desktop. But those are old markets. In new areas, Microsoft has stumbled. Apple created the iPod, and the iTunes store, and the iPhone. Google dominates Internet search, operates arguably the best e-mail system (Gmail) and represents a growing threat in mobile devices with Android. Amazon has grown to dominate online retail, then launched a thriving cloud-computing business (it rents out computer power and data storage), and capped it off with the Kindle e-reader. Microsoft's answers to these market leaders include the Zune music player, a dud; the Bing search engine, which is cool but won't kill Google; Windows Mobile, a smart-phone software platform that has been surpassed by others; and Azure, Microsoft's cloud-computing service, which arrives next year—four years behind Amazon.

How did this happen? How did Microsoft let tens of billions in revenue (and hundreds of billions in market capitalization) slip through its fingers? Hassles with antitrust regulators distracted Microsoft's management and made the company more timid. But the bigger reason seems to be that in January 2000, Gates stepped down as CEO. It's been downhill ever since.

Ballmer is by all accounts an incredibly bright and intensely competitive guy. But he's no Bill Gates. Gates was a software geek. He understood technology. Ballmer is a business guy. To Ballmer's credit, in his decade at the helm Microsoft's revenues have nearly tripled, from $23 billion to $58 billion. The company has built a huge new business selling "enterprise" software—programs that run corporate data centers. Microsoft has also done well in videogames with its Xbox player.

But the problem with putting nontechies in charge of tech companies is that they have blind spots. Gates was quick to recognize that the Internet represented a threat to Microsoft, and he led the campaign to destroy Netscape. In those days Microsoft was still nimble enough that it could pivot quickly and catch up on a rival. Since then the company has become bureaucratic and lumbering.

Worse yet, as Microsoft slowed down, the rest of the world sped up. The new generation of Internet companies needed little capital to get started and could scale up quickly. Google got so big so fast that by the time Microsoft recognized the threat, it could not catch up. With Apple, the threat was not the iPod player itself but the Internet-based iTunes store; by the time Microsoft could create a credible clone of the Apple store, Apple had the market locked down.

Meanwhile, Microsoft's core business hit a snag with Vista. Its engineers have spent three years undoing their mess; Windows 7 doesn't leap past what Apple offers, but it's still really terrific. But while Microsoft has been distracted fixing its broken Windows, yet another new crop of Internet saplings has gained root: Facebook and Twitter in social media, Hulu and YouTube (owned by Google) in online video.

And so it goes. This is perhaps why, in the 10 years of Ballmer's reign, Microsoft's stock has dropped by nearly 50 percent, from $55 to $29. (Apple shares have climbed 700 percent; Google has gone up 400 percent since its IPO in 2004.) A spokesman for Microsoft points out that the company pays a quarterly dividend and in 2004 paid out a special dividend worth $32 billion. Still, it's been a pretty dismal 10 years. Unless the company can do more than focus on the past, the next decade might not be any better.